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When local cost discovery generates knowledge spillovers, specializa-
tion patterns become partly indeterminate and the mix of goods that a
country produces may have important implications for economic growth.
We demonstrate this proposition formally and adduce some empirical sup-
port for it. We construct an index of the "income level of a country￿ s
exports," document its properties, and show that it predicts subsequent
economic growth.
1 Introduction
Why do countries produce what they do, and does it matter? The conventional
approach to these questions is driven by what we might call the "fundamentals"
view of the world. In this view, a country￿ s fundamentals￿ namely its endow-
ments of physical and human capital, labor, and natural resources along with
the overall quality of its institutions￿ determine relative costs and the patterns of
specialization that go with them. Attempts to reshape the production structure
beyond the boundaries set by these fundamentals are likely to fail and hamper
economic performance.
We argue in this paper that specialization patterns are partly indeterminate
and may be shaped by idiosyncratic elements. While fundamentals play an
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1important role, they do not uniquely pin down what a country will produce and
export. Furthermore, not all good are alike in terms of their consequences for
economic performance. Specializing in some products will bring higher growth
than specializing in others. In this setting, government policy has a potentially
important positive role to play in shaping the production structure.
Our analysis is driven by what Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) have earlier
called "cost discovery." An entrepreneur who attempts to produce a good for
the ￿rst time in a developing economy necessarily faces considerable cost un-
certainty. Even if the good comes with a standard technology ("blueprint"),
domestic factor endowments and institutional realities will require tinkering
and local adaptation (see Evenson and Westphal 1995, Lall 2000). What the
entrepreneur e⁄ectively does is to explore the underlying cost structure of the
economy. This process is one with considerable positive externalities for other
entrepreneurs. If the project is successful, other entrepreneurs learn that the
product in question can be pro￿tably produced and emulate the incumbent. In
this way, the returns to the pioneer investor￿ s cost discovery become socialized.
If the incumbent ends up with failure, on the other hand, the losses remain
private. This knowledge externality implies that investment levels in cost dis-
covery are sub-optimal unless the industry or the government ￿nd some way in
which the externality can be internalized.
In such a setting, the range of goods that an economy ends up producing
and exporting is determined not just by the usual fundamentals, but also by the
number of entrepreneurs that can be stimulated to engage in cost discovery in
the modern sectors of the economy. The larger this number, the closer that the
economy can get to its productivity frontier. When there is more cost discovery,
the productivity of the resulting set of activities is higher in expectational terms
and the jackpot in world markets bigger.
In this paper we provide a simple formal model of this process. We also
supply some evidence that we think is suggestive of the importance of the forces
that our formal framework identi￿es. We are interested in showing that some
traded goods are associated with higher productivity levels than others and
that countries that latch on to higher productivity goods (through the cost
discovery process just described) will perform better. Therefore, the key nov-
elty is a quantitative index that ranks traded goods in terms of their implied
productivity. We construct this measure by taking a weighted average of the
per-capita GDPs of the countries exporting a product, where the weights re￿ ect
the revealed comparative advantage of each country in that product.1 So for
each good, we generate an associated income/productivity level (which we call
PRODY ). We then construct the income/productivity level that corresponds
to a country￿ s export basket (which we call EXPY ), by calculating the export-
weighted average of the PRODY for that country. EXPY is our measure of
the productivity level associated with a country￿ s specialization pattern.
While EXPY is highly correlated with per-capita GDPs, we show that there
1A very similar index was previously developed by Michaely (1984), whose work we are
happy to acknowledge. We encountered Michaely￿ s index after the working paper version of
this paper was completed and distributed.
2are interesting discrepancies. Some high-growth countries such as China and
India have EXPY levels that are much higher than what would be predicted
based on their income levels. China￿ s EXPY , for example, exceeds those of
countries in Latin America with per-capita GDP levels that are a multiple of
that of China. More generally, we ￿nd that EXPY is a strong and robust
predictor of subsequent economic growth, controlling for standard covariates.
We show this result for a recent cross-section as well as for panels that go back
to the early 1960s. The results hold both in instrumental variables speci￿cations
(to control for endogeneity of EXPY ) and with country ￿xed e⁄ects (to control
for unobserved heterogeneity).
Our approach relates to a number of di⁄erent strands in the literature. Re-
cent work in trade theory has emphasized cost uncertainty and heterogeneity
at the level of ￿rms so as to provide a better account of global trade (Bernard
et al. 2003, Melitz and Ottaviano 2005). In contrast to this literature, we focus
on the spillovers in cost information and are interested in the economic growth
implications. There is also an empirical literature on the so-called natural re-
source curse, which examines the relationship between specialization in primary
products and economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1995). The rationale for the
natural resource curse is based either on the Dutch disease or on an institu-
tional explanation (Subramanian and Sala-i-Martin 2003). Our approach has
di⁄erent micro-foundations than either of these, and yields an empirical exam-
ination that is much more ￿ne-grained. We work with two datasets consisting
of more than 5,000 and 700 individual commodities each and eschew a simple
primary-manufactured distinction.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We begin in section 2 with a simple
model that develops the key ideas. We then present the empirical analysis in
section 3. We conclude in section 4.
2 A simple model
We are concerned with the determination of the production structure of an
economy in which the standard forces of comparative advantage play some role,
but not the exclusive role. The process of discovering the underlying cost struc-
ture of the economy, which is intrinsically uncertain, contributes a stochastic
dimension to what a county will produce and therefore how rich it will be.
We normalize units of goods such that all goods have an exogenously given
world price p. Each good is identi￿ed by a certain productivity level ￿, which
represents the units of output generated by an investment of given size. We
align these goods on a continuum such that higher-ranked goods entail higher
productivity. The range of goods that an economy is capable of producing
is given by a continuous interval between 0 and h, i.e., ￿ 2 [0;h] (see Figure
1) We capture the role of comparative advantage by assuming that the upper
boundary of this range, h, is an index of the skill- or human-capital level of
the economy. Hence a country with higher h can produce goods of higher
productivity ("sophistication").
3Projects are of ￿xed size and entail the investment of b units of labor. When
investors make their investment decisions, they do not know whether they will
end up with a high-productivity good or a low-productivity good. The ￿ associ-
ated with an investment project is discovered only after the investment is sunk.
All that investors know ex ante is that ￿ is distributed uniformly over the range
[0;h].
However, once the ￿ associated with a project/good is discovered, this be-
comes common knowledge. Others are free to produce that same good without
incurring additional "discovery" costs (but at a somewhat lower productivity
than the incumbent). Emulators operate at a fraction ￿ of the incumbent￿ s
productivity, with 0 < ￿ < 1. Each investor can run only one project, so having
discovered the productivity of his own project, the investor has the choice of
sticking with that project or emulating another investor￿ s project.
An investor contemplating this choice will compare his productivity ￿i to
that of the most productive good that has been discovered, ￿
max, since emulating
any other project will yield less pro￿t. Therefore, the decision will hinge on
whether ￿i is smaller or bigger than ￿￿
max. If ￿i ￿ ￿￿
max, investor i will stick
with his own project; otherwise he will emulate the ￿
max-project. Therefore
the productivity range within which ￿rms will operate is given by the thick part
of the spectrum shown in Figure 1.
Now let￿ s move to the investment stage and consider the expected pro￿ts
from investing in the modern sector. These expected pro￿ts depend on expec-
tations regarding both the investor￿ s own productivity draw and the maximum
of everybody else￿ s draws. As we shall see, the latter plays a particularly im-
portant role. Obviously, E(￿
max) will be an increasing function of the number
of investors who start projects. Let m denote the number of investors who
choose to make investments in the modern sector. Given our distributional







max) equals 0 when m = 0, and converges to h as m ! 1.
Since productivity is distributed uniformly, the probability that investor i
will stick with his own project is
prob(￿i ￿ ￿￿








This eventuality yields the following expected pro￿ts














max] is the expected productivity of such a project. We can


















































Note that expected productivity in the modern sector is











Expected pro￿ts shown in (1) are simply the product of price and expected
productivity. Expected productivity, and in turn pro￿tability are determined
both by "skills" (h) and by the number of investors engaged in cost discovery
(m). The larger m, the higher the productivity in the modern sector. Hence
we have increasing returns to scale in the modern sector, but this arises from
cost information spillovers rather than technological externalities. If ￿ were zero,
productivity and pro￿ts would not depend on m.
2.1 Long-run equilibrium
In long-run equilibrium, the number of entrants in the modern sector (m) is
endogenous and is determined by the requirement that excess pro￿ts are driven
to zero. Let us express the ￿ ow (expected) pro￿ts in this sector as










where m￿ denotes the long-run level of m. Remember that each modern sector
investment requires b units of labor upfront, resulting in a sunk investment
of bw, where w is the economy￿ s wage rate. Long-run equilibrium requires








where ￿ is the discount rate.
Wages are determined in turn by setting the economy￿ s total labor demand
equal to the ￿xed labor supply L. The modern sector￿ s labor demand equals
m￿b. Let the traditional sector￿ s labor demand be given by the decreasing
function g(w), g0(w) < 0. Labor market equilibrium is then given by
m￿b + g(w￿) = L (LL)
5Equations (ZP) and (LL) determine the long-run values of the endogenous
variables m and w. The equilibrium is shown in Figure 2, which plots these
two equations in (m;w)-space. Note that (ZP) and (LL) are both positively
sloped. We have drawn (ZP) as less steep than (LL), because otherwise scale
economies would be so strong that the dynamic behavior of the model would be
unstable under reasonable speci￿cations. This amounts to assuming that ￿ is
not too large.
2.2 Short-run equilibrium
In short-run equilibrium we require labor markets to clear but take m as ￿xed.
This means we are always on the (LL) schedule, with the wage rate determined
by equation (LL) for a given m.
2.3 Dynamics
Given our assumptions so far, if m were allowed to adjust instantaneously we
would jump immediately to the long-run equilibrium given by the intersection
of the (ZP) and (LL) schedules. In fact, forward-looking behavior on the
part of investors in the modern sector provides an additional mechanism for
immediate convergence to the long-run equilibrium. Suppose, for example,
that we start at a level of m which falls short of m￿. On the transition to
the long-run equilibrium, we know that m and w will both rise. Consider how
these dynamics in￿ uence the decision to enter. The rise in m implies that
productivity will be higher in the future than it is today, and is a force that will
induce delay in the decision to invest in the modern sector ceteris paribus. The
rise in w, on the other hand, implies that investment will be more costly in the
future than it is today, and is a factor that will precipitate investment. Given
the relative slopes we have assumed, the second factor outweighs the ￿rst￿ i.e.,
wages increase faster than the rate at which productivity bene￿ts come in￿ and
investors would rather invest today than wait.
To provide the model with some non-trivial dynamics, we can simply assume
that there is a limit to how much investment is feasible per unit of time. To
be concrete, let the rate at which m increases be restricted by the exogenous
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Given the considerations discussed in the previous paragraph, there will be
maximal adjustment in m whenever net returns at time t are non-zero. Hence,
:








m(t) = 0 otherwise
62.4 Comparative dynamics
We are now ready to analyze the behavior of the economy. Starting from
an initial equilibrium given by (m0;w0), consider an increase in the economy￿ s
labor endowment. This shifts the LL schedule down since, at a given m, labor-
market equilibrium requires lower wages. Hence the impact e⁄ect of larger L
is a lower w. However, the lower wage induces more ￿rms to enter the modern
sector and engage in cost discovery, which in turn pulls wages up. How high
do wages eventually go? As Figure 2 shows, the new equilibrium is one where
wages are higher than in the initial equilibrium. A larger labor endowment ends
up boosting wages! What is key for this result is the presence of information
spillovers in the modern sector. Once the modern sector expands, productivity
rises, and zero pro￿ts can be restored only if wages go up.
Increases in p and h operate by shifting the ZP schedule up. They both
result in higher m and w eventually. These results are less surprising.
3 Empirics
The model shows that productivity in the modern sector is driven by ￿
max,
which depends on m, which in turn is driven by country size (L), human capital
(h), and other parameters. In our empirical work, we shall proxy ￿
max with a
measure calculated from export statistics which we call EXPY . This measure
aims to capture the productivity level associated with a country￿ s exports. Fo-
cusing on exports is a sensible strategy since ￿
max refers to the most productive
goods that a country produces and we can expect a country to export those
goods in which it is the most productive. Besides, we have much more detailed
data on exports across countries than we do on production.
In order to calculate EXPY we rank commodities according to the income
levels of the countries that export them. Commodities that are exported by
rich countries (controlling for overall economic size) get ranked more highly than
commodities that are exported by poorer countries. With these commodity-
speci￿c calculations, we then construct country-wide indices.
3.1 Construction of EXPY
First, we construct an index called PRODY . This index is a weighted average of
the per capita GDPs of countries exporting a given product, and thus represents
the income level associated with that product. Let countries be indexed by j





7Let the per-capita GDP of country j be denoted Yj. Then the productivity








The numerator of the weight, xjk=Xj, is the value-share of the commodity in the
country￿ s overall export basket. The denominator of the weight,
P
j (xjk=Xj),
aggregates the value-shares across all countries exporting the good. Hence
the index represents a weighted average of per-capita GDPs, where the weights
correspond to the revealed comparative advantage of each country in good k.
The rationale for using revealed comparative advantage as a weight is to
ensure that country size does not distort our ranking of goods. Consider an ex-
ample involving Bangladesh and US garments, speci￿cally, the 6-digit product
category 620333, ￿men￿ s jackets and blazers, synthetic ￿ber, not knit.￿In 1995,
the US export value for this category was $28,800,000, exceeding Bangladesh￿ s
export value of $19,400,000. However, this commodity constituted only 0.005
percent of total US exports, compared to 0.6 percent for Bangladesh. As de￿ned
above, the PRODY index allows us to weight Bangladesh￿ s income more heav-
ily than the U.S. income in calculating the productivity level associated with
garments, even though the U.S. exports a larger volume than Bangladesh.
The productivity level associated with country i￿ s export basket, EXPYi, is









This is a weighted average of the PRODY for that country, where the weights
are simply the value shares of the products in the country￿ s total exports.2
3.2 Data and methods
Our trade data come from two sources. The ￿rst is the United Nations Com-
modity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) covering over 5000 products
at the Harmonized System 6-digit level for the years 1992 to 2003. The value of
exports is measured in current US dollars. The number of countries that report
the trade data vary considerably from year to year. However, we constructed
the PRODY measure for a consistent sample of countries that reported trade
data in each of the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. It is essential to use a consistent
sample since non-reporting is likely to be correlated with income, and thus, con-
structing PRODY for di⁄erent countries during di⁄erent years could introduce
2As we noted in the introduction, Michaely (1984) previously developed a similar index and
called it "income level of exports." Michaely used a di⁄erent weighting scheme in generating
what we call PRODY , with each country￿ s weight corresponding to the market share in global
exports of the relevant commodity. Compared to ours, therefore, Michaely￿ s approach over-
weights large countries. Michaely￿ s calculations were undertaken for 3-digit SITC categories.
More recently, Lall et al. (2005) have also developed a similar measure that they call the
"sophistication level of exports."
8serious bias into the index. While trade data were actually available for 124
countries over 1999-2001, the real per capita GDP data from the World Devel-
opment Indicators (WDI) database was only available for 113 of these countries.
Thus, with the COMTRADE data, we calculate PRODY for a sample of 113
countries. We calculate PRODY using both PPP-adjusted GDP and GDP
at market exchange rates. In what follows we shall present most of our results
only with the PPP-adjusted measures of PRODY ; we have found no instance
in which using one instead of the other makes a substantive di⁄erence.
The average PRODY from 1999-2001 is then used to construct an EXPY
measure for all countries reporting trade data during the period from 1992 to
2003. Since the number of countries reporting COMTRADE data varies from
year to year, and the coverage is especially patchy for earlier years, the total
number of countries for which we could calculate EXPY ranges from a low of
48 in 1992 to a high of 133 in 2000. Table 1 shows the country coverage for
each of the years between 1992 and 2003.
Some limitations of COMTRADE data are its relatively short time-span
and limited coverage of countries earlier in the period. To check the robustness
of our ￿ndings against these concerns, we have also constructed our measures
with the World Trade Flows dataset which has recently been updated to extend
coverage back to 1962 (Feenstra et al. 2005). Trade ￿ ows are based on 4-digit
standard international trade classi￿cations (SITC rev. 2) comprising over 700
commodities. Our PRODY and EXPY indices are calculated by combining the
World Trade Flows data on export volumes with PPP-adjusted GDP from the
Penn World Tables, yielding a sample of 97 countries for the period 1962-2000.
We prefer to work with the indices based on more disaggregated data, and
the basic patterns in the data are very much consistent between the two datasets.
Hence we limit our discussion of descriptive statistics below to the COMTRADE
data. We return to the 4-digit data when we turn to growth regressions.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Some descriptive statistics on PRODY are shown in Table 2. The ￿rst row
shows PRODY calculated using GDP at market exchange rates and the second
row shows PRODY with PPP-adjusted GDP levels. As the table reveals, the
income level associated with individual traded commodities varies greatly, from
numbers in hundreds (of 2000 US dollars) to tens of thousands. This re￿ ects the
fact that specialization patterns are highly dependent on per-capital incomes.
The ￿ve commodities with the smallest and largest PRODY values are
shown in Table 3. As we would expect, items with low PRODY tend to
be primary commodities. Consider for example product 10120, ￿live asses
mules and hinnies.￿The main reason this product has the lowest income level
is that it constitutes a relatively important part of the exports of Niger, a
country with one of the lowest per capita GDPs in our sample. Similarly, sisal.
cloves, and vanilla beans have low PRODY values because they tend to be
signi￿cant exports for poor sub-Saharan African countries. On the other hand,
product 7211060, ￿ at rolled iron or non-alloy steel, has the highest PRODY
9value because it holds a substantial share of Luxembourg￿ s exports, and this
country has the highest per capita GDP in our sample.
Table 4 and Figure 3 summarize some basic descriptive statistics for EXPY .
We note that the mean EXPY for the sample of countries included exhibits a
downward trend over time. Mean EXPY has fallen from $12,994 in 1992 to
$10,664 in 2003. Since the income levels associated with individual products are
held constant over time (as explained above), this is due partly to the changing
composition of the sample of countries (with more low-EXPY countries being
included over time) and partly to the reduction in EXPY levels in many of the
countries. Indeed, Table 5 shows that a majority of countries (among those
that have EXPY values throughout our sample period) have experienced a
reduction in EXPY over time. This downward trend may be speci￿c to the
recent period, since we do not see a similar trend since the 1960s when we use
4-digit trade data.
How does EXPY vary across countries? Figure 4 shows a scatterplot of
EXPY against per-capita GDP. Unsurprisingly, there is a very strong corre-
lation between these two variables. The correlation coe¢ cient between the two
is in the range 0.80-0.83 depending on the year. Rich (poor) countries export
products that tend to be exported by other rich (poor) countries. Although
in our framework this relationship has a di⁄erent interpretation, it can also be
explained with the Heckscher-Ohlin framework if rich country goods are more
intensive in human capital or physical capital. The relationship between EXPY
and per capita GDP exists partly by construction, since a commodity￿ s PRODY
is determined by the per capita GDPs of the countries that are important ex-
porters of that commodity. However, the relationship is not just a mechanical
one. Calculating country speci￿c PRODY s by excluding own exports from the
calculation of these measures does not change the results much. Note also that
the variation in EXPY across countries is much lower than the variation in
per-capita GDPs. This is a direct consequence of the fact that PRODY (and
therefore EXPY ) is a weighted average of national income levels.
Table 6 shows the countries with smallest and largest EXPY values for 2001
(the year with the largest possible sample size). Note that French Polynesia
(PYF) ranks in the top 5 among those with the largest EXPY . This surpris-
ing outcome arises in part because cultured pearl exports contribute heavily
to a French Polynesia￿ s export basket and this product has a relatively large
PRODY value of $22,888. A few other cases where countries appear to have
very large EXPY values relative to per capita GDP are Mozambique (MOZ),
Swaziland (SWZ), Armenia (ARM), India (IND), and China (CHN). In a couple
of these instances, the culprit is once again a speci￿c commodity with a high
PRODY value: unwrought, alloyed aluminum for Mozambique and "mixed
odoriferous substances in the food and drink industries" for Swaziland. But in
the remaining cases (China, India, and Armenia), this is the result of a portfolio
of a high PRODY exports, and not one or two speci￿c items. At ￿rst sight,
diamonds seem to play a large role in India and Armenia, but both countries
retain their high EXPY s even with diamonds removed from the calculation.
And China has a very diversi￿ed set of exports, with no single product category
10standing out in terms of high export shares. It is worth remembering at this
juncture that China and India have both been experiencing very rapid economic
growth (as has Armenia more recently) .
Figure 5 shows the time trend for EXPY for China, India, and a sample
of other Asian and Latin American countries. Among the Latin American
countries included (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico), only Mexico has a
level of EXPY that is comparable to those in East Asia. This probably re￿ ects
the fact that the exports of the other three are heavily based on primary products
and natural resources, which tend to have lower EXPY s. Chile has the lowest
EXPY by far, and its EXPY has been steadily drifting downwards. At the
other end, South Korea and Hong Kong have the highest EXPY s. Note how
China has signi￿cantly closed the gap with these countries over time. China￿ s
EXPY has converged with that of Hong Kong, even though Hong Kong￿ s per
capita GDP remains ￿ve times larger (in PPP-adjusted terms). And China￿ s
EXPY now exceeds those of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile by a wide margin,
even though China￿ s per-capita GDP is roughly half as large as those of the
Latin American countries. India￿ s EXPY is not as spectacular as China￿ s,
but that is in large part because our measure is based on commodity exports
and does not capture the explosion in India￿ s software exports. Nonetheless,
by 2003 India had a higher EXPY than not only Chile, but also Argentina, a
country that is roughly four times richer.
Do all natural-resource exporting countries have low EXPY s? Figure 6
shows a similar chart for ￿ve primary-product exporting countries: Canada,
Norway, New Zealand, Australia, and Chile. The variation in EXPY among
these countries turns out to be quite large. Once again, Chile is at the bottom
of the scale. But even among the remaining four advanced countries, the range
is quite wide. Canada￿ s EXPY is between 20-25 percent larger than Norway￿ s
or Australia￿ s. Therefore, our measure seems to capture important di⁄erences
among primary product exporting countries as well.
3.4 Determinants of EXPY
What might be some of the fundamental determinants of the variation across
countries in levels of EXPY ? We have shown above that EXPY is highly cor-
related with per-capita GDP. The model laid out in the early part of the paper
suggests that specialization patterns will be determined both by fundamentals
and by idiosyncratic elements. Among fundamentals, the model pointed to
human capital and the size of the labor force as two key determinants. The
￿rst extends the range of "discoverable" goods, and the second promotes cost
discovery through (initially) lower wages. We ￿nd support for both of these
implications in the cross-national data. Human capital and country size (prox-
ied by population) are both associated positively with EXPY , even when we
control for per capita GDP separately (Table 7). It may be di¢ cult to give the
relationship with human capital a direct causal interpretation, since the causal
e⁄ect may go from EXPY to human capital rather than vice versa. But it is
easier to think of the relationship with country size in causal terms: it is hard
11to believe that there would be reverse causality from EXPY to population
size. Interestingly, institutional quality (proxied by the Rule of Law index of
the World Bank, a commonly used measure of institutional quality) does not
seem to be associated with EXPY once we control for per capita GDP (Table
7, column 3).
Even if we ascribe a causal role to per-capita income and human capital,
there is a lot that remains unexplained in the determination of EXPY . Figure
7 shows a scatter plot of deviations from the cross-country norms established in
column 4 of Table 7 against per capita GDP. There are big outliers in either
direction, especially among low-income countries. Mozambique (+88 percent),
Swaziland (+55 percent), and Senegal (+29 percent) have EXPY levels that are
much higher than would be predicted on the basis of the right-hand side variables
in Table 7, while Guinea (-66 percent), Niger (-55 percent), and Burundi (-
57 percent) have much lower EXPY s. If indeed such di⁄erences matter to
subsequent economic performance (and we claim that they do), it is important
to understand where they arise from. Moreover, to the extent that EXPY
levels exert an independent in￿ uence on per capita income levels and human
capital stocks, the "unexplained" component of the cross-national variation in
EXPY is naturally much larger. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) provide some
anecdotal evidence which suggests that successful new industries often arise for
idiosyncratic reasons. Fundamentals are only part of the story.
3.5 EXPY and growth
We ￿nally turn to the relationship between EXPY and economic growth. Table
8 shows a set of cross-national regressions in which growth is regressed on initial
values of EXPY and other regressors.
The maximum time span that we can use for these regressions based on
COMTRADE data is a time horizon of 11 years (1992-2003). However, this
leaves us with a sample of only some 40 odd countries. By focusing on a
somewhat shorter time horizon￿ between 1994 and 2003￿ we can nearly double
the sample of countries included in the regression. The table shows results with
both samples. All regressions include initial per-capita GDP as a covariate.
Human capital is also included in some of the speci￿cations. Finally, we show
both OLS and IV results. We appeal to the theory developed previously and
the empirical results above in using country size (population and land area) as
instruments in the IV speci￿cation. Country size is plausible exogenous with
respect to EXPY levels, and it is rarely included as an explanatory variable in
growth regressions. There is no established theory as to why it should exert an
independent e⁄ect on economic growth (other than through the EXPY channel
which is our focus).
EXPY enters with a large and positive coe¢ cient that is statistically sig-
ni￿cant in all of these speci￿cations (but only at the 10% level of signi￿cance
in one instance). The estimated coe¢ cient varies from 0.034 to 0.082, with IV
estimates being larger than OLS estimates. Taking the midpoint of this range,
the results imply that a 10 percent increase in EXPY boosts growth by half a
12percentage points, which is quite large. Figure 8 shows a representative scatter
plot.
A shortcoming of these regressions is that the time horizon is short, and
that they su⁄er, as with all cross-national speci￿cations, from possible omitted
variables bias. While 6-digit aggregation based on COMTRADE does not
allow us to examine pre-1992 data, 4-digit calculations based on World Trade
Flows allows us to construct a panel going back to 1962. Table 9 shows results
from panel regressions. Data are grouped into 5- and 10-year intervals and
four di⁄erent estimators are used: pooled OLS, IV, OLS with ￿xed e⁄ects (for
countries and years), and GMM. (See notes at the bottom of the table for more
details.) The estimated coe¢ cient on EXPY is signi￿cant in all cases, with
a magnitude that is comparable to that in the cross-section results reported
above. The ￿xed e⁄ects results are particularly telling, since these explicitly
control for time-invariant country characteristics and identify the impact of
EXPY o⁄ the variation within countries. They are signi￿cant in both the 5-
and 10-year panels. These ￿xed e⁄ects estimates suggest that a 10 percent
increase in EXPY raises growth by 0.14 to 0.19 percentage points. This is a
smaller e⁄ect than what we found in the cross-national speci￿cations, but it is
still noteworthy.
4 Concluding remarks
What we have shown in this paper is that there are economically meaningful
di⁄erences in the specialization patterns of otherwise similar countries. We have
captured these di⁄erences by developing an index that measures the "quality" of
countries￿export baskets. We provided evidence that shows that countries that
latch on to a set of goods that are placed higher on this quality spectrum tend
to perform better. The clear implication is that the gains from globalization
depend on the ability of countries to appropriately position themselves along
this spectrum.3
3Some of the policy implications of this is discussed in Rodrik (2004).
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14Table 1:  Sample size of EXPY 
 
















Table 2: Descriptive statistics for PRODY  (2000 US$) 
 
Variable    No. obs.           Mean     Std. Dev.         Min          Max 
mean PRODY, 1999-2001, 
at market exchange rates 
5023 11,316 6,419 153 38,573
mean PRODY, 1999-2001, 
PPP-adjusted 




Table 3:  Largest and smallest PRODY values (2000 US$) 
 
  product  product name   mean PRODY, 
1999-2001 
smallest   140490  Vegetable products nes  748 
  530410  Sisal and Agave, raw  809 
  10120  Asses, mules and hinnies, live  823 
  90700  Cloves (whole fruit, cloves and stems)  870 
  90500 Vanilla  beans  979 
largest  721060  Flat rolled iron or non-alloy steel, coated with aluminium, width>600mm  46,860 
  730110  Sheet piling of iron or steel  46,703 
  721633  Sections, H, iron or non-alloy steel, nfw hot-roll/drawn/extruded > 80m  44,688 
  590290  Tyre cord fabric of viscose rayon  42,846 
  741011  Foil of refined copper, not backed, t < 0.15mm  42,659 
 
 Table 4: Descriptive statistics for EXPY (2000 US$) 
  
Year        Obs.      Mean  Std. Dev.  Min   Max 
1992  48  12,994 4,021  5,344 20,757 
1993  65  12,407 4,179  3,330 20,361 
1994  87  11,965 4,222  2,876 20,385 
1995  99  11,138 4,513  2,356 19,823 
1996  111  10,950 4,320  2,742 20,413 
1997  119  10,861 4,340  2,178 19,981 
1998  119  11,113 4,621  2,274 20,356 
1999  126  11,203 4,778  2,261 26,218 
2000  133  10,714 4,375  1,996 25,248 
2001  133  10,618 4,281  2,398 24,552 
2002  127  10,927 4,326  2,849 24,579 





Table 5:  Number of countries that show an increase/decrease in EXPY, 1992-2003 
 
  EXPY, ppp   EXPY, market XRs 
Increase 8  13 






Table 6: Countries with smallest and largest EXPYs 
 
 Reporter    EXPY 
Smallest  Niger  2,398 
 Ethiopia  2,715 
 Burundi  2,726 
 Benin  3,027 
 Guinea  3,058 
Largest  Luxembourg   24,552 
 Ireland  19,232 
 Switzerland  19,170 
 Iceland  18,705 







Table 7: Correlates of EXPY 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Dependent variable: log EXPY in 2001 
        
log GDP per capita  0.354  0.298  0.288  0.282 
 (14.75)**  (9.37)**  (6.96)** (7.47)** 
log human capital    0.281  0.268  0.157 
   (2.08)*  (1.79)  (1.16) 
rule of law index      0.019  0.065 
     (0.41)  (1.58) 
log population        0.089 
       (5.01)** 
log land area        -0.032 
       (2.30)* 
constant 6.090  6.405  6.497  5.523 
 (27.39)**  (26.45)**  (18.03)** (14.66)** 
        
Observations 131  102  101  100 
R-squared 0.72  0.75  0.74  0.79 
     Robust t-statistics in parentheses 





























Table 8:  Cross-national growth regressions 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
   Dependent variable: Growth of GDP per capita over 1992-2003  Dependent variable: Growth of GDP per capita over 1994-2003 
  OLS  OLS IV  IV OLS  OLS IV  IV 
          
log initial GDP/cap  -0.015 -0.019 -0.017 -0.025 -0.008 -0.013 -0.012 -0.018 
 (2.37)*  (2.89)**  (2.47)*  (3.79)** (1.90) (2.78)** (1.41)  (2.54)* 
log initial EXPY 0.060 0.056 0.072 0.082 0.035 0.034 0.046 0.053 
 (3.96)**  (3.83)**  (3.42)** (3.93)** (3.05)** (2.74)** (1.95)  (2.47)* 
log human capital    0.028  0.024  0.021  0.015 
   (2.02)*   (1.83)   (2.20)*   (1.41) 
constant -0.419  -0.357  -0.501  -0.550 -0.242 -0.201 -0.305 -0.323 
 (4.32)**  (3.68)**  (3.49)** (3.59)** (3.15)**  (2.36)* (2.08)* (2.35)* 
          
observations  46 43 44 42 85 69 76 68 
R-squared 0.35  0.40  0.36  0.36 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.23 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
Instruments for IV regressions: log population,  log  land  area.          
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level     Table 9:  Panel growth regressions, 1962-2000 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  5-year panels  10-year panels 
    OLS IV  FE  GMM  OLS IV  FE  GMM 
          
log initial GDP/cap  -0.0117 -0.0299 -0.0272 -0.0143 -0.0128 -0.0384 -0.0318 -0.0177 
 (4.39)**  (4.78)**  (4.24)** (2.65)** (4.42)** (4.37)** (5.69)**  (2.37)* 
log initial EXPY  0.0287  0.0739  0.0185 0.0446 0.0286 0.0919 0.0141 0.0444 
 (5.38)**  (5.06)**  (2.26)*  (4.10)** (5.22)** (4.54)** (1.97)*  (2.29)* 
log human capital  0.0068  0.0041  0.0049 0.0035 0.0077 0.0045 0.0038 0.0085 
 (3.27)**  (1.76)  (1.08)  (0.92)  (3.75)** (1.75)  (0.81)  (1.23) 
constant -0.1146  -0.3372  0.0937  -0.2301 -0.1076 -0.4197 0.1640 -0.2023 
 (4.08)**  (4.68)**  (1.35)  (3.91)** (3.68)** (4.25)** (2.53)*  (1.75) 
          
observations  604 604 604 604 299 299 299 299 
R-squared  0.16  0.05  0.13     0.24     0.28    
  Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
  All equations include period dummies. IV regressions use log population and log area as instruments. Fixed effects(FE) include dummies for countries. GMM is the   
Blundell-Bond System-GMM estimator using lagged growth rates and levels as instruments. The GMM estimation also use log population and log area as additional 
instruments. 




























































Figure 4: Relationship between per-capita GDP and EXPY, 2003 
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 Figure 7: Deviations from cross-national norm for EXPY 
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